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INTRODUCTION
Women across the globe have a long way to go before achieving equality in
the workplace. According to ongoing research by the United Nations, women
are less likely to participate in the labor market than men, and women are paid
less than men; women are more likely to hold places in informal and vulnerable
employment positions, and women are much more likely to hold a position of
unpaid or domestic work. The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) states that “Parties shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment
in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights . . .”
and goes on to address several of the inequities listed above: the right to the same
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employment opportunities, the right to equal renumeration, and the right to free
choice of profession and employment.1
CEDAW discusses specifically the relationship between employment and
maternity, stating that “[i]n order to prevent discrimination against women on
the grounds of . . . maternity” state parties must “introduce maternity leave with
pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of former employment . . .”2
As is clear from the title of the convention, CEDAW is an affirmation of both
the equality of women and the unacceptability of discrimination on the basis of
sex. The convention does not strip its subjects of their womanhood for the end
of promoting equality, but rather recognizes the ability of women to procreate
and care for their families and condemns this as a basis for discrimination.3 This
idea “goes to the heart of the Convention,” because it acknowledges that a
biological difference between men and women is more than a protected
characteristic or women’s issue—it is a “matter of social significance.”4 Not
only should women’s procreative ability not be a basis for discrimination, the
convention goes a step farther to state that “the upbringing of children requires
a sharing of responsibility between men and women . . .”5
International human rights case law and treaties, such as CEDAW, are
created out of a need to provide a source for equal rights where they previously
did not exist. Despite a prevailing belief in the inherent human dignity of every
person dating back to the earliest modern human rights documents,6 many
marginalized and oppressed groups do not share equal rights. One group of
individuals, usually a racial, religious, ethnic, and often male, majority enjoys
rights; human rights law works to ensure the enjoyment of those same rights for
a counterpart, marginalized minority. Often, establishing rights for peoples
previously without access involves not only eliminating barriers, but in some
instances, implementing policies to address these wrongs. What in the United
States we call “affirmative action,” the international human rights community
calls “positive action measures.”7 One of the most common and controversial
questions surrounding affirmative action is the question of whether positive
actions to help a disadvantaged group can harm others in the process. On the

*Juris Doctor Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2022. Bachelor of Arts in Political Science
and Philosophy, Roanoke College, 2017. I would like to thank Professor Paolo Carozza for
encouraging my research and supporting my interest in this topic. I would also like to thank the
members of the Notre Dame Journal of International &amp; Comparative Law for their review of this
note in preparation for publication.
1
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 11, ¶ 1, Sept. 3,
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
2
Id. at art. 11, ¶ 2.
3
Id. at pmbl.
4
Christine Chinkin & Beate Rudolf, Commentary, The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women: A Commentary, 48 Oxford University Press (2012).
5
CEDAW, supra note 1, at pmbl. See also E. Abena Antwi, WOMEN IN THE WORLD OF WORK: AFTER
EIGHTY-SIX YEARS, HAS THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION DONE ENOUGH TO PROMOTE
EQUALITY, 31 N.C.J. INT’L. & COM. REG. 793, 800–04 (2005) (assessing the development of maternity
protections promulgated by the International Labor Organization).
6
. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, The Longing for Freedom, in A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR
ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
7
Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights
Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 254–55 (1999).
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issue of working mothers and maternity leave, the question is simply, “what
about fathers?”
In 2019, the England Court of Appeals, Civil Division, held in the case
Capita Customer Management Ltd. v. Ali (Working Families Intervening);
Hextall v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire Police (Working Families
Intervening)8 (hereinafter “Capita Customer Management”) that providing
enhanced maternity leave pay and benefits to mothers is not discrimination
against men as fathers. This case is not only example of a question of women’s
rights being discriminatory against men, it is a unique question because of the
dual purpose of maternity leave rights: to protect the health rights to recover
from pregnancy and childbirth for a mother,9 and to protect the health and
wellbeing of a newborn child.10 The first purpose is obviously unique to women
as mothers, but nevertheless, there is an opportunity for inequality in the rights
of new parents when fathers do not have the same resources to partake in
childcare.
This note will address two interrelated issues—first, whether it is
discriminatory to provide better maternity leave benefits and higher pay to
women as mothers when men as fathers are not entitled to the same benefits and
pay, and second, whether full realization of parental leave rights necessarily
demands identical benefits for men and women.
Part I of this paper will describe the relevant human rights treaties and
principles to the rights of parents and the complexity of the issue of
nondiscrimination. Part II will describe the background legal framework of
maternity leave and parental leave in the United Kingdom and European Union,
as well as relevant case law of the European Court of Justice.11 Part III will
analyze the legal framework and EU case law within the framework of the
international human rights principles from Part I, with a particular emphasis on
answering the question of whether inequality in parental leave rights violates the
principle of non-discrimination. Lastly, Part IV will analyze what full realization
of parental leave rights may look like, using Capita Customer Management as
an example and describing how that case could have come out differently using
my conclusions.

8

Mr. Madasar Ali v. Capita Customer Management Ltd.; The Chief Constable of Leicestershire Police v.
Mr. Anthony Hextall (Working Families); Mr. Anthony Hextall v. The Chief Constable of Leicestershire
Police, [2019] ECWA (Civ) 900 [hereinafter Capita Customer Management].
9
For the purposes of this paper, I will be using the simplified gender dichotomy of men and women,
fathers and mothers. This paper does not reference the category of “mothers” as expanded to “persons
who give birth.” The issue of gender and childbearing becomes more nuanced and inclusive when
describing gender identity and fluidity, however this paper does not get into this issue for two reasons:
(1) simplification, and (2) thus far, there is no relevant case law which discusses the complexities in
gender identity and maternity leave from an international human rights perspective. Furthermore, this
paper does not discuss the nuances of parental leave rights in families with two mothers or two fathers,
again for simplicity and because this creates an even more nuanced and complicated side to the problem
than I have ability to address here. For a discussion of the complexities in the relationship between
maternity and gender, see Courtney Megan Cahill, The New Maternity, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2221 (2020).
10
See Miguel de la Corte Rodriguez, Maternity Leave and Discrimination against Fathers: Current Case
Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Way Forward, 4 INT’L COMPAR. JURIS. 27
(2018).
11
Although the United Kingdom is no longer an EU member state, it was at the time of Capita Customer
Management v. Ali, and its maternity leave principles are rooted in the EU requirements for maternity
leave. For more information, see infra note 47.
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I: PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
A. DISCRIMINATION
Since 1948 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the principle of
nondiscrimination has been foundational to promoting international human
rights. Although the UDHR uses language of “distinction” rather than
discrimination, it was revolutionary in its expanded list of protected groups:
“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.”12 These prohibited grounds are more comprehensive than the
Declaration’s predecessor, the Charter of the United Nations, which guarantees
human rights and fundamental freedoms “without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion.”13 Although the inclusion of a message of
nondiscrimination in the UDHR highlights the universality of the principle,14
nondiscrimination is ever evolving and includes even more protected groups
now than it did in 1948, such as age and disability.15
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
contains almost identical language about discrimination as the UDHR, except
that the ICESCR uses the word discrimination rather than distinction.16 The
principle of nondiscrimination also appears in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political rights, as well as every other UN human rights treaty since
the UDHR. This reflects not only the universality of the principle, but also its
importance to the international human rights legal framework as a whole.17
CEDAW understandably focuses its provisions on discrimination against
women, defining the term “discrimination against women” as
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of
sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective
of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and
12

UDHR, supra note 6, at art. 2.
UN Charter art. 13.
14
See JOHANNES MORSINK, The Drafting Process Explained, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT (1999). This describes how the UDHR gave birth to
more covenants and a multitude of regional human rights documents, the inclusion of the principle of
nondiscrimination in which “is made possible by the idea that while the standards are universal, their
implementation will be the more successful the closer the attention to local circumstances.” Id. (quoting
R.J. VINCENT, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY WORLD SOCIETY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009). See
also Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM.
J. INT’L L. 38 (2003).
15
BEN SAUL, DAVID KINLEY & JACQUELINE MOWBRAY, Commentary, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: COMMENTARY, CASES, AND MATERIALS 193 (Oxford
University Press 2014).
16
See G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, at Part II art. 2(2) (Dec. 16,1966) (“The
State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present
Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, or birth status.”) [hereinafter ICESCR].
17
SAUL, KINLEY & MOWBRAY, supra note 15, at 173.
13
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women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.18
The ICESCR does not define discrimination as narrowly as CEDAW, the latter
of which uses the strong language of “exclusion or restriction” and “effect or
purpose” to bring more context to the definition. CEDAW also conveys its
definition within the context of the given field of women’s rights, whereas the
ICESCR is more general.
To analyze the claims in Capita Customer Management and the line of cases
from the European Court of Justice, it is important to understand the difference
between direct and indirect discrimination. The way meanings of these two types
of discrimination varies slightly between the ICESCR, the UK Equality Act, and
the EU Equal Treatment Directive. Starting with the ICESCR, the text of which
actually includes a very bare-bones definition of discrimination, we can look to
UN General Comment 20 for additional substance, noting that
discrimination constitutes any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference or other differential treatment that is
directly or indirectly based on the prohibited grounds of
discrimination and which as the intention or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise,
on an equal footing, of Covenant rights. Discrimination also
includes incitement to discriminate and harassment.19
According to the General Comment, direct discrimination is “intention to
discriminate.”20 The definition of direct discrimination references both instances
where a person is treated differently in a comparable situation as well as
instances where an act or omission treats one person more favorably when there
is no comparable situation. For example, unequal pay for equal work would
constitute direct discrimination because two people are doing the same work,
but one person is paid less for no reason other than being a member of a protected
class. A case where a woman is fired, or perhaps even just denied promotion,
solely on the grounds that she is pregnant would also constitute direct
discrimination. Although “pregnant people” is not listed as a protected group in
any covenant definition of discrimination, only women can get pregnant, and
therefore discrimination for pregnancy is still direct discrimination even without
a comparable situation for men.
Indirect discrimination “refers to laws, policies or practices which appear
neutral at face value, but have a disproportionate impact on the exercise of
Covenant rights as distinguished by prohibited grounds of discrimination.”21
The example given by the General Comment is a policy that requires a birth
certificate for school enrollment, which may seem reasonable but indirectly
disadvantages ethnic minorities or non-nationals.22 Comparatively, direct
18

CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 1.
Comm. On Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment 20, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/20, at II
¶ 7. (July 2, 2009) [hereinafter CESCR].
20
SAUL, KINLEY & MOWBRAY, supra note 15, at 183.
21
CESCR, General Comment 20, supra note 19, at ¶10(b).
22
Id.
19
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discrimination seems easier to identify because it carries an intention to
discriminate. In contrast, even if not conscious or systemic, indirect
discrimination is often the passive result of “laws, policies or practices.”23
Discrimination does not need to be active or intentional; if an act or omission
has the effect of discrimination, it is violative of the principle of
nondiscrimination.24
In the European Union’s Equal Treatment Directive (ETD), direct
discrimination is “where one person is treated less favourably on grounds of sex
than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation.” Indirect
discrimination has a similar definition to the ICESCR, including elements of “an
apparently neutral provision, criterion, or practice [that] would put persons of
one sex at a particular disadvantage compared with persons of the other sex,”
but qualifies it, saying “unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively
justified by a legitimate aim.”25 Although these definitions vary slightly, the
important theme in both direct and indirect discrimination is comparability. The
definitions in the UK Equality Act closely mirror those of the ETD,26 but the
Equality Act has an interesting exception for discrimination because of
pregnancy. Section 18(2) of the Act prohibits “unfavourable” treatment based
on pregnancy. “The legal term ‘unfavourable’ makes the protection against
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or maternity particularly strong. By
using the term ‘unfavourable,’ Parliament freed victims from having to prove
discrimination by way of a comparator who lacked the characteristic but was
treated better.”27 In other words, as opposed to a phrase such as “less favourable”
which would imply a comparable situation, a person experiencing discrimination
based on pregnancy does not have to prove that another person has been treated
more favorably in a similar circumstance.28 This distinction plays an important
role in analyzing maternity discrimination, because a huge component of
maternity, the biological condition of women, does not lend itself to a
“comparable situation.”29
Another difference between direct and indirect discrimination is a court’s
treatment of justification for violating the principle of non-discrimination. In
cases of direct discrimination, “the grounds for derogation are typically specified
in the relevant equality norm.”30 Conversely, justifications for indirect
discrimination are more open ended.31

23

Id.
SAUL, KINLEY & MOWBRAY, supra note 15, at 181.
25
Council Directive 2006/54, art. 2, 2006 (EC).
26
See infra notes 48 and 49.
27
Susan Bisom-Rapp & Malcolm Sargeant, It’s Complicated: Age, Gender, and Lifetime Discrimination
against Working Women - the United States and the U.K. as Examples, 22 ELDER L.J. 1, 54 (2014).
28
Id.
29
But see Nancy E. Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex Differences into Account, 54 FORDHAM L. REV.
699, 71517 (1986) (finding that the United States uses an “equal treatment model, in which sex
differences are never grounds for discrimination because there can always be an analogy, or “common
denominator,” between the two groups. In the case of maternity leave, the common denominator under
this approach would be any other temporary disability, male or female).
30
Sean Pager, Strictness vs. Discretion: The European Court of Justice’s Variable Vision of Gender
Equality, 51 AM. J. INT’L L. 553, 556 (2003).
31
Id.
24
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B. INTERDEPENDENCE, INTERRELATEDNESS, AND INDIVISIBILITY
The ICESCR and other human rights covenants set forth rights in separate
paragraphs, often grouped by category. However, it is a well-established
principle of international human rights law that all rights are interlinked,
corresponding to one another in a variety of ways. Even beyond rights of a
certain category, the principles of indivisibility, interdependence, and
interrelatedness mean that all rights are interwoven, even those in the oftenjuxtaposed categories of civil and political rights versus economic, social, and
cultural rights.32 A critique of this understanding of human rights is that saying
that all rights are indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated does not leave
room for any hierarchy, or the ability to make a normative judgment that some
rights are more important than others.33 However, these principles do not
interfere with an inevitable hierarchy of human rights, but rather provide a
structure by which all rights can be understood in a universal, comprehensive,
and inclusive way. Rather than getting in the way of enforcing fundamental
rights, the principles of indivisibility, interdependence, and interrelatedness
create a framework under which a new group of protected persons or situation
of discrimination that has not been previously considered, the human rights
promised in international covenants can apply.34
Because of these principles, the right to parental leave cannot be looked at
in a vacuum. In the ICESCR, the right to parental leave is guaranteed under the
greater right to work. Parental leave is closely interrelated with rights to privacy
and family as well. Furthermore, the principles of indivisibility,
interdependence, and interrelatedness do not just describe the relationship of
rights that belong to one individual; there is interaction between holders of rights
as well. In the context of maternity leave, there is interdependence between a
mother’s right to work, right to health, and rights to privacy and family. Along
with the rights of the mother, however, are the child’s rights of health and
wellbeing. When expanding leave rights to fathers as well, the three principles
can prompt an analysis of how enhanced paternity leave benefits can advance
mothers’ rights in the workplace, as well as the aforementioned rights of health
and wellbeing of the child.
C. POSITIVE ACTION MEASURES
CEDAW provides for the adoption of “temporary special measures aimed
at accelerating de facto equality between men and women,”35 or what we call in
the United States “affirmative action.” It is sometimes also referred to as
“positive action” measures. The justification for states to actually undertake
measures to ensure equality, rather than just preventing non-discrimination, is
found in provisions of the ICESCR and CEDAW which obligate states to take

32

THEO VAN BOVEN, Categories of Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 173–187 (Daniel
Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, Sandesh Sivakumaran & David Harris, eds., 2017).
33
Id. at 181.
34
Id. at 187. See also MORSINK, supra note 14.
35
CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 4.1.
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positive steps to promote the enjoyment of rights.36 No matter what they are
called, positive action measures generally include “any program that takes
positive actions to enhance opportunities for a disadvantaged group, with a view
to bringing them into the mainstream of civic and economic life.”37 A policy
such as maternity leave may not quite fit the definition of affirmative action as
we know it in the United States, which generally encompasses controversial
components such as preferences and quotas.38 Another reason maternity leave
may not quite fit the definition of positive action measures is that CEDAW
provides for “temporary special measures.”39 However, the importance of
affirmative action to international human rights law, and maternity leave in
particular, is that states have, by signing the ICESCR or CEDAW, agreed to
implement positive measures to address inequality and discrimination.40 It is not
enough for a state party to one of these covenants to refrain from discriminatory
policies; they must also act against discrimination by “all appropriate means,”
especially legislation.41 Furthermore, the theoretical purposes behind affirmative
action are much more broad than the idea of policies that advantage certain
groups. The purposes for affirmative action, “ending equality deprivations and
advancing economic wellbeing,” are anchors for the various policies that
follow.42
One criticism of the use of affirmative action as a lens to view discrimination
is that it “historically reinforced a ‘sameness’ approach to anti-discrimination
law.”43 This “sameness” approach views positive action measures as exceptions
to the norm, when they should in fact be “understood as an integral dimension
of equality.”44 By treating members of a protected class as exceptions, rather
than as a different (but just as “normal”) group, positive action measures
“reinforce stereotypes and prejudices about the ‘natural’ inequality of
individuals from groups in need of different treatment.”45 In the context of
maternity leave, this argument would mean that in a system where special
treatment on the grounds of pregnancy and childbirth is justified as an
“exception,” a woman taking advantage of the protection is admitting her
variation from the norm and perpetuating a stereotype that her employment is
not natural, but her childbearing is. The above criticism fails to provide an
alternative for guarantying maternity protection of women if not through an

See Id. (“States Parties. . . agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of
eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake. . .[t]o adopt appropriate legislative
and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against
women[]”). See also ICESCR, supra note 16, at art. 2 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation. . .with a view
toward achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present covenant by all
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”).
37
Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 7, at 254–55.
38
Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 7, at 255.
39
CEDAW, supra note 1, at art 4.1 (emphasis added).
40
Ursula O’Hare, Equality and Affirmative Action in International Human Rights Law and Its Relevance
to the European Union, 4 INT’L J. DISCRIMINATION & L. 3, 18 (2000).
41
ICESCR, supra note 16, at art. 2.
42
Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 7, at 258.
43
Colleen Sheppard, Mapping anti-Discrimination Law onto Inequality at Work: Expanding the Meaning
of Equality in International Labour Law, 151 INT’L LAB. REV. 1, 6 (2012).
44
Id. at 6.
45
Id.
36
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exception and special treatment. There is much more going on in perpetuating
that stereotype than the framework of positive action.

II: CASE LAW AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. CAPITA CUSTOMER MANAGEMENT LTD. V. ALI (WORKING FAMILIES
INTERVENING); HEXTALL V. CHIEF CONSTABLE OF LEICESTERSHIRE POLICE
(WORKING FAMILIES INTERVENING)
The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”)46 has a line of case law regarding
family leave policies and the specific issue of discrimination against men. The
two main laws at play in these cases are the Pregnant Workers’ Directive
(“PWD”) and the Equal Treatment Directive (“ETD”). The case under analysis
in this note, Capita Customer Management Ltd. v. Ali, is a case decided by an
appeals court in the United Kingdom in 2019, when the UK was still a member
nation of the EU.47 The UK has its own legal framework of maternity leave and
shared parental leave that is in conformity with the PWD and ETD.
This 2019 case out of the England Court of Appeal, Civil Division, involved
two plaintiffs claiming discrimination because of special treatment to women in
connection with pregnancy. In the first case, an employee of Capita Customer
Management sought time off to care for his newborn child when his wife was
diagnosed with post-partum depression and advised to return to work. Capita
provided twelve weeks of full pay to mothers on maternity leave, but denied the
male employee the same rate of pay. Ali sued under direct discrimination,48 and
the employment tribunal held that due to an exclusion for special treatment in
relation to pregnancy and childbirth, the direct discrimination claim was
unsustainable. The second case involved a male police constable, Hextall, who
was paid a statutory rate of pay while on shared parental leave, as opposed to a
female constable who would receive “enhanced maternity pay.” The plaintiff in
this case brought a claim of indirect discrimination, alleging “special treatment
to women in connection with pregnancy and childbirth.”49 The plaintiff’s claim
in this case was similarly denied on the basis that it was not actually an instance
of discrimination because sex equality did not have effect in relation to special
treatment afforded women in connection with pregnancy or childbirth. Both
employees sued, and the Court of Appeal affirmed both decisions, finding that
entitlement to maternity leave and maternity pay was not regarded as sex
discrimination.

46

Sometimes also referred to as CJEU (Court of Justice of the European Union).
Because Capita Customer Management was decided while the UK was still a member state, I will
analyze the reasoning and outcome in the context of precedent EU cases for the purpose of applying the
principles of international human rights law outlined above. At the time Capita Customer Management
was decided, the CJEU had binding jurisdiction over UK courts. See Sylvia de Mars, Brexit next steps,
The Court of Justice of the EU and the UK (Feb. 7, 2020), https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/brexitnext-steps-the-court-of-justice-of-the-eu-and-theuk/#:~:text=period%2C%20and%20beyond.-,The%20Court%20of%20Justice%20of%20the%20EU%2
0(CJEU)%20interprets%20EU,a%20role%20in%20UK%20law.
48
See Equality Act 2010, UK Public General Acts 2010, c. 15, Part 2, Ch. 2, §13 (1), (6).
49
See id. at §19.
47
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The Court’s judgment in this case, that a woman’s enhanced pay and
benefits under maternity leave does not constitute sex discrimination, is
dependent upon the Court’s view of the primary purpose of the leave. The Court
stated that “the predominant purpose of such leave was not childcare but other
matters exclusive to the birth mother resulting from pregnancy and childbirth
not shared by the husband and partner.”50 In England and throughout the
European Union, maternity leave is understood to have two purposes—the
protection of the delivering mother, and the protection of a child who needs care
after birth.51 The first of these two purposes, that women who are pregnant and
give birth need to be protected through a particular period of vulnerability, is
necessary to justify enhanced maternity benefits and higher pay for women than
men on parental leave. To understand how the Court in Capita Customer
Management v. Ali came to its conclusion that favorable treatment on the basis
of sex is not discrimination, one has to understand the law and theory of
maternity leave in the European Union, the particular statutory scheme in
England, and the Hofmann reasons, which has shaped much of the case law in
the European Union regarding family leave rights.
B. MATERNITY LEAVE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION – THE PREGNANT WORKERS’
DIRECTIVE AND THE EQUAL TREATMENT DIRECTIVE (PREDOMINANT PURPOSE)
Of the two purposes of maternity leave, protection of women who bear
children and give birth and protection of a newborn child, the Pregnant Workers’
Directive (PWD) clearly concerns the former. Grounded in the principle of
equality between the sexes, the fundamental right to work, and the right to a
healthy workplace, the PWD guarantees measures to protect the health and
safety of “pregnant workers, workers who have recently given birth or who are
breastfeeding. . . .”52 This directive ensures health and safety protections, safe
breastfeeding opportunities, the right to maternity leave and pay, and protection
from dismissal. The purpose of protecting women as mothers is obvious from
these enumerated safeguards, but is also rooted in the type of rights themselves.
As with the Pregnant Workers Directive, all the protections are specifically
connected with the right to work and the rights of women to equality in the
workplace. Rather than discussing childcare or maternal bonds with newborn
children, the PWD focuses on the rights of a mother in the workplace, not her
rights as a mother in private or family life.
The Equal Treatment Directive serves to implement the principle of equality
of treatment for men and women, specifically “as regards access to employment,
including promotion, and to vocational training and as regards working
conditions…”53 Article 2 provides exceptions to the Directive, and the latter two
provisions provide the basis for determining whether maternity leave benefits
can be regarded as discrimination. Article 2(3) states that “[t]his Directive shall
be without prejudice to provisions concerning the protection of women,
particularly as regards pregnancy and maternity” and article 2(4) states that
50
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“[t]his Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal
opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities
which affect women's opportunities in the areas referred to in article 1(1).”54
These two provisions provide important elements of interpretation of direct and
indirect discrimination; in article 2(3), whether there is a “comparable situation,
and in article 2(4), the mandate to implement positive action measures that do
not have discriminatory effects.55
Although it may appear that there would never be a “comparable situation”
for a man “as regards pregnancy and maternity” as stated in article 2(3), the
Court of Justice of the European Union has found cases where situations are
comparable.56 There will never be a “comparable situation” in the first element
of this direct discrimination test if the mother’s situation has strictly to do with
her health and recovery from pregnancy and childbirth; a man will never
experience a similar need for recovery in his capacity as a father. However, if
the mother’s need for maternity leave is related to the purpose of childcare, there
is more likely to be a comparable situation because the father is, theoretically,
equally involved in childcare.57 The second element, differential treatment on
the grounds of sex, similarly analyzes the difference between mothers in their
statuses as persons who have just been pregnant and given birth and mothers as
employed persons entitled to benefits. If there is differential treatment towards
mothers as employed persons in their rights to work rather than their rights to
health and recovery, the treatment is likely to be discriminatory.58
Lastly, in understanding the dual purpose of maternity leave, it is important
to note the general scheme of statutory leave requirements in the European
Union. There is a minimum of fourteen weeks of maternity leave across the
European Union, which is intended to cover the average six weeks incapacity
that most women experience when recovering from pregnancy.59 This minimum,
which covers a six-week recovery period and a subsequent eight-week period
for caring for a newborn, accounts for both fundamental purposes of maternity
leave—one accounting for biological sex differences, and the other unconnected
to gender.
C. STATUTORY SCHEME IN ENGLAND – MATERNITY LEAVE AND SHARED PARENTAL
LEAVE
The scheme of maternity leave and shared parental leave in England directly
accounts for both purposes of maternity leave. In England, every mother who
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gives birth is required to take a compulsory two weeks of maternity leave.60
After the mandatory two weeks, a mother can then take up to fifty additional
weeks of maternity leave, with pay available for thirty-nine of those weeks.61
However, after the mandatory two weeks, or at any point during the subsequent
fifty weeks, a mother can choose to relinquish the remainder of her maternity
leave and use the balance as shared parental leave to be split by a mother and
her partner. This leave is flexible, as it allows the parents to share leave however
they want; it does not have to be taken all at once or any amount by a certain
parent.62 Although this leave is shared, the decision to opt into shared parental
leave lies with the mother. A father’s right to shared parental leave is completely
tied to the mother; a mother must voluntarily relinquish the remainder of her
maternity leave to share leave with a partner. Like statutory maternity leave, pay
is available for the first thirty-nine weeks of shared parental leave.63
This scheme accounts for both purposes of maternity leave: the compulsory
two weeks for a recovering mother is directly related to the protection of women
as mothers, and protection of childcare for a newborn is present in the mother’s
choice to take up to an additional fifty weeks of leave and the opportunity for
her to share her leave with her partner as early as the end of the compulsory two
weeks.
D. CASE LAW AND THE HOFMANN REASONS
Several cases out of the ECJ address the relationship between maternity,
childcare, benefits for fathers, and discrimination. Only two cases directly
answer questions of discrimination against fathers in the context of maternity
leave, specifically by interpreting the exception in Article 2(3) of the ETD:
Hofmann v. Bermer Ersatzkasse and Betriu Montull v. INSS.64 Hofmann is still
the major precedent for cases involving discrimination against men and Article
2(3) of the ETD, and its line of thinking is present in cases involving other issues
of discrimination against men in the context of maternity and childcare,
including breastfeeding and adoption.
Hofmann v. Barmer Ersatzkasse involved a German plaintiff who submitted
a claim for maternity pay but was refused by the Social Security Administration.
At the time, maternity leave in Germany was six months long, with the first eight
weeks as compulsory recovery from childbirth and the rest of the six months as
optional. The plaintiff, Hofmann, took leave from his employer and cared for his
child while the child’s mother returned to work after the compulsory eight
weeks. Hofmann’s leave, however, was unpaid and he was denied maternity
payment on the basis that “only mothers could claim maternity leave and the
corresponding allowance.”65 Hofmann filed an administrative appeal to the
60
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German Social Court and was denied again on the basis that “the legislature
deliberately did not create a period of leave capable of being granted to either
parent.”66 Hofmann appealed again, arguing that after the compulsory period of
eight weeks had ended, maternity leave was no longer concerned with protecting
the mother’s health but “exclusively with the care which she gave to the child.”67
The question in this case was an interpretation of the exception in Article
2(3) of the ETD. The Court stated that the “decisive factor is whether maternity
leave is to be regarded as a ‘provision concerning the protection of women,
particularly as regards pregnancy and maternity’ within the meaning of Article
2(3) thereof.”68 The Court concluded that the whole period of statutory maternity
leave, not just the first eight weeks of compulsory leave, is reserved to the
mother “to the exclusion of any other person” because it is only the mother who
experiences the effects of pregnancy and childbirth.69 This privilege for new
mothers is legitimate under Article 2(3) and the promotion of equal treatment
for two reasons. First, because “it is legitimate to ensure the protection of a
woman’s biological condition during pregnancy and thereafter until such time
as her physiological and mental functions have returned to normal after
childbirth.” Second, because “it is legitimate to protect the special relationship
between a woman and her child over the period which follows pregnancy and
childbirth, by preventing that relationship from being disturbed by the multiple
burdens which would result from the simultaneous pursuit of employment.”70
These “Hofmann reasons” remain the prevailing standard for ECJ jurisprudence
interpreting the exception in Article 2(3) of the ETD.71
The next ECJ case that directly interpreted the issue of discrimination and
maternity leave is Betriu Montull v. INSS. Almost 30 years after Hofmann,
plaintiff Betriu Montull brought suit when he was refused maternity pay under
the Spanish social security scheme. The plaintiff’s wife was self-employed and
therefore covered by a less advantageous scheme of maternity benefits. The
plaintiff, however, was an employee covered by general social security, a
scheme which would provide sixteen weeks of maternity leave plus
compensation.72 The sixteen weeks included six weeks of compulsory leave
following childbirth plus ten weeks of voluntary leave, and the plaintiff’s request
was for a benefit equivalent to the latter ten weeks.73 This scheme of maternity
leave is unique from Hofmann in that a father is actually entitled to share the
latter ten weeks as “parental leave,” however, Betriu Montull was unable to
benefit from the leave because the child’s mother was not covered by the same
scheme. The INSS refused the leave on the grounds that “the right to leave is a
right of mothers who are covered by a State social security scheme … the father
does not have his own autonomous, separate right to leave, independent of the
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mother’s right, but only a right which necessarily derives from that of the
mother.”74
Three decades after Hofmann, the ECJ had the opportunity to re-evaluate
the Hofmann reasons. In Betriu Montull, the Spanish AG argued before the Court
that while the first six weeks of compulsory leave was for mothers alone, who
were unique in their need for recovery and to which there was no comparable
situation for fathers, the latter ten weeks should not be protected under the
Article 2(3) exception.75 By providing that mothers could elect for their partner
to take responsibility in either some or all of the last ten weeks of leave, the
Spanish legislature had intended for maternity leave to be about the protection
of the newborn child, and that child’s relationship with both the mother and the
father.76 However, the ECJ declined to depart from the Hofmann reasons, stating
that Article 2(3) recognized the legitimacy of equal treatment “first, of protecting
a woman’s biological condition during and after pregnancy and, second, of
protecting the special relationship between a woman and her child over the
period which follows childbirth.”77
Other cases of the ECJ have dealt with analogous issues of sex differences
in the realm of childcare. A 1983 case related to Italian adoption leave,
Commission v. Italy, addressed the question of whether men were entitled to
adoption leave.78 At that time, Article 6 of Law No. 903 provided that Italian
women were entitled to three months of leave and maternity allowance after
adopting a child under six years of age.79 After those first three months, a mother
is entitled to an additional six months of job-protected leave which the father is
entitled to share either “in lieu of the working mother or where the care and
custody of the children are given to the father.”80 However, it is only this second
portion of leave that a father can share in; an adoptive father does not have the
right to take leave during those first three months. The Court held that this was
justified “by the legitimate concern to assimilate as far as possible the conditions
of entry of the child into the adoptive family to those of the arrival of a newborn
child in the family during the very delicate initial period.”81
A 2010 case from the ECJ, Roca Alvarez v. Sesa Start España, also dealt
with an issue tangential to maternity leave, but led to a different outcome. A
Spanish law called the “Workers Statute” provided for “breastfeeding leave.”82
The law states that “[f]emale workers shall be entitled to take one hour off work,
which they may divide into two parts, in order to breastfeed a child under the
age of nine months … This time off may be taken by the mother or the father
without distinction, provided that they are both employed.”83 The plaintiff in this
case tried to exercise his entitlement to the breastfeeding leave but was refused
74

Id. at ¶22.
de la Corte Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 34.
76
Id.
77
Betriu Montull v. INSS, supra note 64, at ¶62.
78
de la Corte Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 29.
79
Case C-163/82, Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic, ECLI:EU:C:1983:295,
3288 (Oct. 26, 1983).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Roca Alvarez v. Sesa Start España, 2010 E.C.R. I-0866, at ¶7. See also Workers Statute art. 37(4)
(B.O.E. 1995, 75) (Spain).
83
Id.
75

2022

ROLE REVERSAL

89

on the ground that the child’s mother was self-employed, and her employment
was an essential condition of the father’s entitlement to leave. The lower court
held that breastfeeding leave is reserved for female employees and that a father
is only entitled to the leave on the condition that the child’s mother is employed.
The ECJ, however, found that the provision was discriminatory because it
established “a difference on the grounds of sex, within the meaning of Article
2(1) of Directive 76/207, as between mothers whose status is that of an employed
person and fathers with the same status.”84 Unlike Hofmann, Betriu Montull, and
Commission v. Italy, which held that maternity and adoption leave was a
preferential benefit for mothers because of their unique relationship with their
child, Roca Alvarez held that bottle-feeding fathers were of the same status as
breastfeeding mothers. Despite the obvious biological condition of
breastfeeding, the Court found that the leave itself “has been detached from the
biological fact of breastfeeding, so that it can be considered as time purely
devoted to the child and as a measure which reconciles family life and work
following maternity leave.”85
It is important to note that the provision at issue in Roca Alvarez was Article
2(1) of the ETD, not the pregnancy exception in Article 2(3). “It was not simply
because the ‘breastfeeding leave’ law treated men and women differently, but
because this particular disparity could worsen women’s employment
opportunities, that the policy violated the principle of equal treatment.”86 The
Court in Roca Alvarez takes something into account that it did not consider in
Hofmann, Betriu Montull, or Commission v. Italy: the effect of the policy on
women’s employment opportunities and the principle of “reducing existing
inequalities in society.”87
E. IS IT CONSISTENT?
The Hofmann reasons generally align to the two purposes of maternity
leave. The first reason, the justifiable “protection of a woman’s biological
condition during pregnancy and thereafter until such time as her physiological
and mental functions have returned to normal after childbirth” is uncontroversial
support for the first purpose of maternity leave: health and wellbeing of the
mother following pregnancy and childbirth. While the second reason, protection
of “the special relationship between a woman and her child over the period
which follows pregnancy and childbirth, by preventing that relationship from
being disturbed by the multiple burdens which would result from the
simultaneous pursuit of employment” seems related to childcare and the
wellbeing of the newborn, it differs in how it is very mother-centric. The second
purpose of maternity leave does not make mention to one parent over another,
but the wellbeing of the child.
Roca Alvarez seems like the clear outlier in these four cases, but is arguably
consistent as well. The Court in Roca Alvarez was not interpreting the
breastfeeding leave policy under the Article 2(3) exception, but the Article 2(1)
prohibition on sex discrimination. Each of these four cases, Hofmann, Betriu
84
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Montull, Commission v. Italy, and Roca Alvarez, recognizes a clear demarcation
between the purpose of maternity leave that is for a mother’s medical recovery
and the purpose that is caring for the child. In the former three cases, the Court
found that making mothers the primary holders of the right to maternity leave
properly fell within the Article 2(3) exception. In the latter case, the analysis of
breastfeeding and bottle feeding as comparable situations led the Court to hold
that tying the father’s right to leave to the mother’s employment was a
discriminatory policy under Article 2(1).

III. ANALYSIS
Each of these cases alleging discrimination regarding maternity leave or
other childcare benefits was brought by a male plaintiff, including the recent
Capita Customer Management case. Applying the principles of
nondiscrimination from Part I, the first question is whether there is even
discrimination in any of these cases. The Court in Capita Customer Management
explicitly found that there was no discrimination. The ECJ in Hofmann, Betriu
Montull, and Commission v. Italy found that the discrimination fell within the
scope of an exception “concerning the protection of women, particularly as
regards pregnancy and maternity.”88 Lastly, in Roca Alvarez, the ECJ found that
there was discrimination on the grounds of sex in violation of Article 2(1) of the
ETD.
In Capita Customer Management, both Ali and Hextall brought claims of
direct and indirect discrimination. When both of Hextall’s claims were
dismissed, he only appealed the claim on indirect discrimination. The relevant
law to Ali and Hextall’s claims was the UK Equality Act, which does provide
for an exception to a discriminatory “provision, criterion or practice,” if it is “a
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.”89 The appeals court denied
Ali’s direct discrimination claim, citing Hofmann and the “different purpose”
served by maternity leave for a “female comparator.”90 The Court also found for
the purposes of the indirect discrimination claim that even if the statutory pay
scheme “creates a particular disadvantage to men . . . the justification defence
must still apply so that special protection is secured to birth mothers.”91
Although it referenced Hofmann, the Capita Customer Management Court did
not analyze Ali or Hextall’s claims in relation to the Equal Treatment Directive.
Although this particular case will never be answered using the ETD and
exception under Article 2(3) because the UK is no longer an EU member state,
it is not difficult to see the same legal philosophy as Hofmann and Betriu
Montull.
As mentioned earlier, the definitions of direct and indirect discrimination in
the UK Equality Act closely mirror those in the ETD, so it is not surprising that
the Court in Capita Customer Management came to similar conclusions as the
ECJ. Does this mean that discrimination against men in these contexts does not
violate international human rights principles of nondiscrimination? Not
88
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necessarily. Each of the decisions in Hofmann, Betriu Montull, Commission v.
Italy, and Capita Customer Management dealt with an exception to
discriminatory treatment; the courts all found that the treatment at the source of
the claims was lawful. It seems clear that most of these claims could not
withstand an argument of direct discrimination because of a comparability
analysis. No father can claim that he has undergone a comparable situation to
the pregnancy and childbirth which a mother undergoes. The claim in
Commission v. Italy could have come out differently, because there is certainly
an argument to be made that a new adoptive father is in a comparable situation
to a new adoptive mother. However, the Court in Commission v. Italy “simply
accepted at face value the Italian government’s view that the discrimination was
justified . . . Why only mothers, but not fathers could facilitate this assimilation
[into the adoptive family] was not discussed.”92
Nevertheless, the Court did not find indirect discrimination in any of these
cases either, but given the ICESCR definition, none of the policies in these cases
appear “neutral at face value.” In fact, the appeals court in the UK and the ECJ
in each of its opinions found explicitly that the intention of the policies was to
benefit working mothers. Roca Alvarez would be the only case of indirect
discrimination with a progressive policy that appeared beneficial for both sexes,
but had the discriminatory effect of tying a father’s right to leave to the mother’s
employment. “The universe of facially-neutral norms having differing effects on
men than women encompasses a much broader spectrum than the genderspecific norms caught by the prohibition on direct discrimination.”93 Because of
this spectrum, the courts interpreting indirect discrimination have a lot more
freedom of interpretation to determine whether the norms are discriminatory or
not, as opposed to constricting “gender-specific norms,” which are “restricted to
defined derogations.”94
A criticism to the notion of discrimination against men is the controversial
advocacy of advocating for “men’s rights” when women experience
discrimination and inequality in the majority of areas when compared with men.
This argument is especially controversial because advocates for “men’s rights”
typically are not discussing rights where women enjoy rights at the expense of
men, but rather a change in the balance that has remained the status quo for so
long. This debate is often found in discussions of affirmative action, an issue
which “inevitably generates opposition as an unfair turn of the tables, reverse
discrimination against individuals not responsible for society’s past
discrimination.”95 Although this argument is a distorted understanding of human
rights usually perpetrated by those who are reluctant to stray from tradition,
courts have sometimes found policies that do unjustly discriminate on the basis
of sex, race, or another protected characteristic, although not the traditional
minority group who holds that characteristic.96
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However, this finding may not sit quite right. How can we say that fathers
are a protected group, disadvantaged by a society that prioritizes women as
caregivers? In this analysis where a father’s right to parental leave is not
freestanding, although it has been held as not discriminatory by the ECJ in
several cases, the focus is on the second purpose of maternity leave. In each case,
Capita Customer Management, Hofmann, Betriu Montull, and Commission v.
Italy, none of the plaintiffs contested the compulsory period of maternity leave
that immediately follows childbirth. There is no question of indirect
discrimination during this compulsory period of leave; a statutory period where
a woman is required to remain home from work, and during which period her
employer is required to pay her and hold her job, is not “neutral at face value,”
nor does it have a “disproportionate impact.” There is no dispute that people who
give birth require a period of recovery from a biological condition that men do
not have. This fact is evident in the United Kingdom’s statutory scheme of
maternity leave, which provides that employees still qualify for leave if the child
is stillborn after 24 weeks or dies after birth.97 The first purpose of maternity
leave, health and recovery after pregnancy and childbirth, is a primary objective
in each of the cases discussed, where a period of compulsory leave from two to
six weeks allows for recovery before a mother is even allowed to share the leave
with her spouse.98
The question in Capita Customer Management and each of the ECJ cases
could be expressed as a matter of whether the second purpose of maternity leave,
protection and wellbeing of the newborn child, is a purpose unique to the mother
as well. The ECJ in Hofmann unquestionably thought it was, phrasing the second
purpose of maternity leave as protection of “the special relationship between a
woman and her child.”99 The Court in Hofmann went on to say that the Article
2(3) exception of the ETD seeks to protect a woman not only in connection with
the effects of pregnancy, but with motherhood as well.100 The plaintiffs in the
Hofmann line of cases brought suit for discrimination against their rights as
fathers. Although the UK Court of Appeals and ECJ found no discrimination,
the differential treatment experienced by these men seems like it could be a
“provision, criterion or practice” that puts fathers at a disadvantage.101 But now
let’s flip the question posed in the introduction to this paper on its head—“what
about mothers?”
Though the second Hofmann reason is mother-centric and seems quite
sexist, the Hofmann Court was not intending to set a legal precedent that would
keep women at home and men at work. The Court justifies the second,
controversial Hofmann reason with an intention to prevent the mother-child
relationship “from being disturbed by the multiple burdens which would result
from the simultaneous pursuit of employment.”102 They clearly recognize that
97
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there is an element of “the mother-child” relationship, which puts women at a
disadvantage in the workplace. The idea that women face obstacles in their
employment, specifically in relation to pregnancy and childbearing, is visible in
the laws and statutes that guarantee the maternity rights at issue in each of these
cases. The ETD exception in Article 2(3) states that “[t]his directive shall be
without prejudice to provisions concerning the protection of women, particularly
as regards pregnancy and maternity.”103 The Pregnant Workers Directive
protects pregnant employees from physical or chemical danger while pregnant
and breastfeeding, and also orders that women must not be dismissed from work
because of their pregnancy and maternity for the period from the beginning of
their pregnancy to the end of the period of leave from work.104 Betriu Montull
also makes reference to Council Directive 2010/18/EU, a Framework
Agreement on parental leave which states that the object of the directive is “to
improve the reconciliation of work, private and family life for working parents
and equality between men and women . . . ”105 The same case also cites Article
10(2) of the ICESCR for the “special protection” of mothers before and after
childbirth.
Furthermore, the second Hofmann reason may be even more nuanced than
appears at first glance. As mentioned earlier, the Hofmann reasons seem to map
onto the two generally accepted purposes of maternity leave, except that the
second purpose of maternity leave primarily focuses on the wellbeing of the
child and the second Hofmann reason focuses on the mother-child
relationship.106 The disconnect in each case comes in when we get past the initial
compulsory period of recovery which provides for the biological certainty that
pregnancy and childbirth bring the need for medical recovery. At the stage of
childcare, is the primary purpose for the benefit of the child, or the benefit of the
mother? And if it is the former, should there be more room for fathers?
The Court in Hofmann made the explicit decision to authorize a genderspecific protection of “the special relationship between a woman and her child.”
The Court could have just as easily protected parent-child relationships by
giving fathers the same right of extended leave, and even just as easily
accomplished “the goal of protecting mothers against multiple burdens. . . if the
father took care of the child.”107 One argument is that the Court in Hofmann
understood the exception under Article 2(3) of the ETD to be “neutral.”108 The
exception is there, and once a woman is pregnant and qualifies for special
protection, the Court is extremely deferential to those protections and generally
will not conduct a discrimination analysis.109
Because of the principles of indivisibility, interdependence, and
interrelatedness of human rights, the right to maternity leave must be considered
103
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in context. It is not just the right of a mother to take time off work after giving
birth to care for her child. It is the right to health, both before and after
pregnancy. It involves various rights in work and employment, including the
right not to be discriminated against based on procreative ability, the right to
obtain pay in the weeks following childbirth, and the right to take time off to
care for a newborn child. It also involves the rights to private and family life.110
The ICESCR recognizes the rights of parent to raise their children as they
choose, with an adequate standard of living. Article 10 of the ICESCR says that
“[t]he widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the
family, which is the natural and fundamental group of society . . . ”111
The principles of indivisibility, interdependence, and interrelatedness do not
just apply to the interconnections between rights of one rights-holder; they also
include the relationship between rights of rights-holders themselves.112 In the
context of maternity leave, and as evidenced by the second purpose of maternity
leave, a mother’s right to leave from employment is indivisible from a newborn
child’s right to health and wellbeing. A family’s right to an adequate standard of
living is interdependent with parents’ right to work. Most importantly, at least
for the understanding of these cases and a father’s right to childcare leave, is that
a woman’s right to success and nondiscrimination in the workplace is
interrelated with a father’s right to childcare leave, and a father’s right to equal
participation in childcare responsibilities.113
The second Hofmann reason, which justified denial of a father’s
independent right to paternity leave by enforcing “the special relationship
between a woman and her child,”114 seems to perpetuate a harmful stereotype
that mothers are caregivers and fathers are breadwinners. Without spending too
much time on criticism of the Hofmann reasons, because several articles already
do,115 I want to challenge just how sexist the ECJ in Hofmann really is. First of
all, the protection of the “special relationship between a woman and her child”
does not stand alone; it is qualified. The ECJ wants mothers to foster that
relationship and also balance the “multiple burdens. . . from the simultaneous
pursuit of employment.”116 Hofmann was decided in 1984, when a concern for
fathers to balance children and work simply was not as much of a concern.
Furthermore, the ECJ’s holding in Hofmann should be understood in the context
of deference to the member state. An important principle of the European Court
is the margin of appreciation, a judicially created doctrine of self-restraint that
is the cornerstone for respect for the diversity of nations within a human rights
system.117 While the ECJ is not an international human rights court, it is a court
with jurisdiction over many member states with diverse cultures and interests. A
decision of the ECJ, therefore, should not be understood as the unconditional
view of the Court; it almost always includes some deference to the member
state’s policy. In Hofmann, that meant upholding the importance of the mother110
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child relationship to the policy of maternity leave that was already present in
Germany’s interpretation of Article 2(3) of the ETD.118
A. WHAT DOES FULL REALIZATION OF PARENTAL LEAVE RIGHTS LOOK LIKE?
First of all, compulsory leave for recovery from pregnancy and childbirth is
a necessary component of fully realized parental leave rights. In the full context
of parental leave, procreation is not equal. “Considering a unique role of mother
with which a woman is blessed, appropriate mechanism for providing maternity
benefit is required to ensure her active participation in economic activities post
maternity.”119 CEDAW poses the obligation in its preamble that the upbringing
of children is “the role of both parents in the family,” but then immediately
acknowledges women’s unique role in procreation.120 There is room for
improvement in the sharing of responsibility for childcare through the means of
parental leave, but the sharing is a childcare responsibility. Pregnancy,
childbirth, and the recovery that follows are responsibilities for mothers alone.
121 “Raising a child is a cherished goal for parents. However, the phases of
pregnancy and maternity make the working woman more vulnerable.”122
A criticism of this compulsory period of leave for health and recovery is that
it is paternalistic. In a proposed extension of the minimum compulsory period,
the European Commission stated that “a longer leave will have a positive impact
on the mother’s health. It will help women to recover from giving birth and to
create a solid relationship with the child.”123 The idea that new mothers should
be required to stay at home and be told what is best for them and their children
does indeed sound paternalistic. However, there is more to the paternalism and
disfavor of the policy than displeasure at a mandatory period of recovery.124 The
compulsory period could also be seen as a benefit to employer-employee
negotiations.125 Another criticism is that making maternity leave mandatory
“increases the competitive advantage of those who are ineligible for maternity
leave, especially fathers.”126 Is the solution to make paternity leave mandatory
as well?
“Fathers, too, face social and economic pressures that prevent them from
taking advantage of paternity or parental leaves to which they are statutorily
entitled.”127 Women voluntarily take up more leave because the law facilitates
118
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this through mandated periods of leave, and during this time women develop
caregiving skills that men do not.128 Paternity leave is always optional. 129
“Mandatory maternity leave does limit women’s choice to resume work
immediately following birth, but it protects women’s ability to choose to
exercise their right to an adequate maternity leave. Similarly, mandatory
paternity leave may enable fathers to resist employer pressures to continue
working, even when they want to stay home to care for a young child.”130
The first purpose of maternity leave is fairly straightforward and really only
has one obligation: to provide a period of recovery following pregnancy and
childbirth. The second purpose, however, is not so straightforward. Put simply,
the second purpose of maternity leave is “the protection of the child who needs
care after birth.”131 Care for the child after birth, however, implies several
actions that need to take place. Someone has to care for the child, and given that
the context of this purpose is maternity leave, the assumption is that someone is
the child’s mother. However, the context of maternity leave also implies that the
mother is taking leave from something, namely, work, and therefore has to
account for payment and job retention. Furthermore, the mother is not the only
one who can care for the child, and according to the ICESCR and CEDAW,
should not be the only one.132
In each of the cases from the UK and European Union, there was some right
for fathers to take leave, even if tied to the mother’s employment or right to leave
herself. None of the plaintiffs in these cases sued for leave because none was
provided. Maybe, then, Hofmann was not so wrong in its second purpose; it
actually progressively accounted for the interrelatedness of maternity and
discrimination in the workplace, rather than analyzing childcare in a vacuum.
The effect, however, may indirectly perpetuate the very discrimination it sought
to remedy. By placing the emphasis on the “mother-child relationship,” the
Court in Hofmann was endorsing a traditional notion of women as caregivers,
not men. “It is not always easy to separate rules that genuinely assist mothers
and their children by facilitating a woman’s pursuit of both paid work and
parenting, from laws that operate to confine women to their traditional
subordinate status, and to relieve men of their fair share of responsibility for
childraising.”133 As mentioned above, the Court in Hofmann was deferential to
the law of the member state, which led to a highly controversial ruling. The
difficulty in the margin of appreciation is that it tends to be more tolerant of
gender stereotypes, “favoring exceptions from formal equal treatment, which
may be viewed as complements to the primary rule that in fact perfects it.”134
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balancing the demands of parenting and the demands of work may actually be a
perpetuation of “uneven parenting demands on mothers.”135
It is natural to see the importance of maternity leave, for mothers and for
children, but we may not pay close attention to what happens after, when the
mother goes back to work. This is not to say that maternity leave is not a solution,
because it is. It is to say that improved parental leave benefits for men may
actually help solve any remaining discrimination or perpetuating stereotypes.
And because of the principles of indivisibility, interdependence, and
interrelatedness, we cannot leave the rights-holder, that is the child, out of an
analysis of fully realized parental leave rights. In addition to the benefits to the
child’s wellbeing, “job-protected and income-reimbursed” parental leave is
financially beneficial for the whole family.136 This is consistent with the
ICESCR’s right of a family to an adequate standard of living.137 There is also
empirical research to suggest that “paternity leave-taking has the potential to
boost fathers’ practical and emotional investment in infant care,” however not
in isolation.138 “[I]t is embedded in a complex web of parenting styles, parental
work practices, infant behavior, and wider socioeconomic factors.”139
Full realization of parental leave rights involves more than the right to leave
and right to maternity allowance for mothers. It even involves more than these
same benefits for fathers. To be fully realized, there must be prioritization of the
wellbeing of the child from both parents. Additionally, a mother does not need
to be stripped of her unique procreative role for parental leave rights to be fully
realized. The mother-child bond in the first months of the newborn’s life is of
the utmost importance; however, so is the father-child bond. The special bond
between the father and the child, and a more even distribution of childcare
between both parents, could alleviate some of the pressure on women by (1)
giving women more flexibility in their choices of how long to take leave and
when to return to work, and (2) acting against the stereotype that sometimes
holds women back. “To reconcile work-family conflict without perpetuating
traditional gender roles, we need employment policies that protect paternal
caregiving and the special relationship between the father and the child.”140
Using the principles of indivisibility, interdependence, and interrelatedness, full
realization of parental leave rights must promote the wellbeing of the child, of
the mother, and of the family, while simultaneously working to achieve equality.
B. WAS CAPITA CUSTOMER MANAGEMENT WRONG?
Jurisprudentially, Capita Customer Management was not wrongly decided.
At the time of the case, the United Kingdom was still a member state of the
European Union, and although the relevant law was the UK Equality Act and
135
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not the ETD, the definitions and interpretations of direct and indirect
discrimination are quite similar, making the outcome in Capita Customer
Management consistent with the Hofmann cases. However, the more important
question is whether the outcome in Capita Customer Management reflects a full
realization of parental leave rights.
The cases and policies throughout this analysis have focused on a dichotomy
of purpose for maternity leave: the health and recovery of the mother, and the
wellbeing of the child. In Capita Customer Management, the facts of the case
were that plaintiff Ali was staying home with his newborn child while his wife
returned to work because she had been diagnosed with post-partum
depression.141 At the end of the day, mothers have biological differences that
necessitate a period of physical recovery; however, the health of the mother does
not always get better two to six weeks after childbirth. If full realization of
parental leave rights involves the wellbeing of the child, the mother, and the
family, then Capita Customer Management may not have achieved this purpose.
Of course, a law or policy can never be perfect or cover every hard case, but the
importance of maternal health to maternity leave as a human right, and the
inflexibility in the cases analyzed above, means that we should keep striving
toward full realization of parental rights for men while simultaneously
promoting women’s and mothers’ unique roles in society and in their children’s
lives.
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